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The Benchmark U.S. Treasury 
Market: Recent Performance 
and Possible Alternatives
he U.S. Treasury securities market is a benchmark. As  
obligations of the U.S. government, Treasury securities are 
considered to be free of default risk. The market is therefore a 
benchmark for risk-free interest rates, which are used to 
forecast economic developments and to analyze securities in 
other markets that contain default risk. The Treasury market is 
also large and liquid, with active repurchase agreement (repo) 
and futures markets. These features make it a popular 
benchmark for pricing other fixed-income securities and for 
hedging positions taken in other markets.
The Treasury market’s benchmark status, however, is now 
being called into question by the nation’s improved fiscal 
situation. The U.S. government has run a budget surplus over 
the past two years, and surpluses are expected to continue (and 
to continue growing) for years. The debt held by the public 
is projected to fall accordingly and, under reasonable 
assumptions, much of the outstanding debt could be paid back 
within the next decade. The declining stock of debt may impact 
Treasury market liquidity and efficiency, thereby making 
Treasuries a less useful benchmark of risk-free interest rates as 
well as a less useful benchmark for pricing and hedging other 
fixed-income securities.
Moreover, recent market events have heightened concerns 
about the Treasury market’s benchmark role and provided 
insight into how the market may perform in the future. For 
instance, yield spreads between Treasuries and other fixed-
income securities widened sharply amid the financial markets 
crisis in the fall of 1998 in a so-called “flight to quality.” A 
related “flight to liquidity” also caused yield spreads among 
Treasury securities of varying liquidity to widen sharply. 
Consequently, some of the attributes that make the Treasury 
market an attractive benchmark were adversely affected.
This paper examines the benchmark role of the U.S. 
Treasury market and the features that make it an attractive 
benchmark. In it, I examine the market’s recent performance, 
including yield changes relative to other fixed-income markets, 
changes in liquidity, repo market developments, and the 
aforementioned flight to liquidity. I show that several of the 
attributes that make the U.S. Treasury market a useful 
benchmark were negatively affected by the events of fall 1998, 
and that some of these attributes did not quickly return to their 
precrisis levels. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the agency 
debt, corporate debt, and interest-rate swaps markets have 
features that might make them attractive benchmarks, and that 
the agency debt and swaps markets in particular are already 
assuming a limited benchmark role.
The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market
A number of features contribute to the U.S. Treasury market’s 
role as a benchmark. Treasuries are backed by the full faith and 
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credit of the U.S. government and are therefore considered to 
be free of default risk.1 Issuance to pay off maturing debt and 
raise needed cash has created a stock of Treasuries held by the 
public that totaled $3.6 trillion on September 30, 1999. The 
creditworthiness and supply of Treasury securities have 
resulted in a highly liquid round-the-clock secondary market 
with high levels of trading activity and narrow bid-ask spreads. 
Treasuries trade in an extremely active repo market in which 
market participants can borrow securities and finance their 
positions, as well as in an active futures market in which market 
participants can buy and sell securities for future delivery.
As Treasuries are considered to be free of default risk, yields 
on these securities represent risk-free rates of return. These 
risk-free rates are used in a variety of analytical applications to 
forecast interest rates, inflation, and economic activity. The 
rates are also used as benchmarks in the analysis and 
monitoring of other fixed-income and non–fixed-income 
securities. The performance of corporate bonds, for example, is 
often examined relative to that of Treasury securities, as the 
comparison allows one to separate yield changes due to 
changes in the risk-free rate from yield changes due to changes 
in credit risk (or due to the pricing of such credit risk).
Treasury securities are also used extensively for pricing 
securities and hedging positions in other U.S. dollar fixed-
income markets. When a fixed-rate corporate debt issue is 
initially sold, for example, it is typically marketed in terms of a 
yield spread to a particular Treasury security rather than at an 
absolute yield or price.2 Similarly, a position taken in a 
corporate debt issue is frequently hedged in the Treasury 
market. The ability to hedge in the Treasury market increases 
dealers’ willingness to make markets and take positions in other 
markets, and thereby improves the liquidity of these other 
markets.
While the creditworthiness of Treasury securities is critical 
to their use as benchmark risk-free rates, the liquidity and 
efficiency of the market are also important. A highly liquid 
Treasury market ensures that observed Treasury prices are 
close to the market consensus of where prices should be and 
that changes in prices reflect revisions in the market consensus. 
An efficient market ensures that the risk-free rates implied by 
Treasury yields closely reflect the market’s views of risk-free 
rates and that prices are no more than minimally affected by 
issue-specific differences in liquidity, supply, or demand.
When one evaluates the Treasury market’s use as a 
benchmark for pricing and hedging purposes, features such as 
relative market performance, well-developed repo and futures 
markets, and liquidity are important. To be a good pricing or 
hedging vehicle, Treasury prices should be highly correlated 
with prices in other markets. A loss in a dealer’s long position 
in mortgage-backed securities, for example, could then be 
offset by a dealer’s short position in Treasuries. Hedges 
frequently involve taking short positions, so the ability to 
borrow Treasury securities at a low cost in the repo market is 
important. (The futures market can also be used to take short 
positions.) Finally, Treasury market liquidity is important, as 
hedgers must be able to buy and sell large Treasury positions 
quickly with minimal transaction costs.
Features of the Treasury market that make it a good 
benchmark thus depend on how one uses the market as a 
benchmark. Creditworthiness, liquidity, and efficiency are 
important as a reference benchmark for risk-free rates, but 
relative market performance is not important and active repo 
and futures markets are important only so far as they benefit 
liquidity. Relative market performance, active repo and futures 
markets, and liquidity are important as a pricing and hedging 
benchmark, but creditworthiness and efficiency are important 
only so far as they influence liquidity and relative market 
performance.
The Shrinking Public Debt
As noted, the benchmark status of the U.S. Treasury market is 
being called into question by the country’s improved fiscal 
situation. In fiscal year 1999, U.S. government revenues 
exceeded outlays by $123 billion, resulting in the first 
consecutive budget surpluses since 1956-57. As of July 1999, the 
U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1999), or CBO, was 
projecting growing budget surpluses for the next ten years 
(under existing laws and policies), rising from $161 billion 
in fiscal year 2000 to $413 billion in fiscal year 2009 
(including Social Security trust funds).
The budget surpluses are reducing the stock of Treasury 
debt outstanding. Debt held by the public stood at $3.6 trillion 
on September 30, 1999, down from its peak of $3.8 trillion a 
year and a half earlier.3 As of July 1999, the CBO was projecting 
that such debt would continue to fall over the next ten years, to 
$0.9 trillion at the end of fiscal year 2009. As a percentage of 
GDP, debt held by the public was projected to fall from 
40.9 percent in 1999 to 6.4 percent in 2009.
The U.S. Treasury Department initially responded to its 
decreased funding needs by cutting issue sizes. In particular, bill 
sizes were cut sharply in March 1997 such that three-month bill 
sizes, for example, fell from the $11-$14 billion range to the 
$6.0-$8.5 billion range (excluding amounts issued to Federal 














Note: LTCM is Long-Term Capital Management.
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To continue to ensure large, liquid issues, the Treasury 
announced in May 1998 that it would limit further contraction 
of bill sizes and concentrate coupon offerings around larger, 
less frequent issues.4 The Treasury thus reduced issuance of the 
five-year note from monthly to quarterly and eliminated 
issuance of the three-year note altogether. In August 1999, the 
Treasury announced that is was reducing the issuance 
frequency of the thirty-year bond from three times a year to 
twice a year and that it was considering reducing the issuance 
frequency of one-year bills and two-year notes.
To maintain large auction sizes and the liquidity of the most 
recent (on-the-run) issues, the Treasury proposed a debt 
buyback program in August 1999 and announced a revision to 
the original issue discount (OID) rules in November 1999. 
Under the buyback program, launched in January 2000, the 
Treasury will redeem outstanding unmatured Treasury 
securities by purchasing them from their current owners.5 
Changes to the OID rules allow the Treasury to reopen its most 
recent issues within one year of issuance without concern that 
the price of the issues may have fallen by more than a small 
amount.
Changes in policy or economic conditions may forestall a 
considerable shrinkage of the Treasury debt. Even if the market 
does shrink substantially, the Treasury Department’s efforts to 
maintain large and liquid issues may stave off significant 
market repercussions. Nonetheless, the improved fiscal 
situation advances the possibility that the Treasury market will 
shrink considerably and that issuance sizes and/or frequencies 
will have to be reduced further.6
Reduced debt outstanding and reduced issuance sizes and/or 
frequencies would likely impact several Treasury market 
attributes. The market would likely become less liquid, with 
wider bid-ask spreads, reduced depth, and less trading activity. 
Reduced issuance sizes and/or frequencies would likely 
decrease the supply of lendable securities and thereby drive up 
the cost of borrowing issues in the repo market. Issue-specific 
differences in liquidity would probably become more 
important in determining prices. In turn, Treasuries might 
perform more disparately from other fixed-income securities.
Persistent fiscal surpluses could thereby make the Treasury 
market a less attractive benchmark. While Treasuries will 
remain free of default risk, the reduced market liquidity and 
efficiency would decrease their usefulness as risk-free 
benchmarks. Greater costs of borrowing securities in the repo 
market combined with reduced liquidity and increasingly 
disparate performance would make Treasuries less desirable 
benchmarks for pricing securities or hedging positions in other 
markets.
The Recent Performance of the 
Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market
Recent financial market events have heightened concerns about 
the U.S. Treasury market’s benchmark role and have provided 
direction as to how the market may perform in the future. In 
the fall of 1998, global financial market turmoil spurred 
investors to seek the safety of U.S. Treasury securities, driving 
prices up and yields down. As shown in Chart 1, the yield on 
the ten-year U.S. Treasury note dropped 125 basis points, to 
4.16 percent, between August 19, 1998, and October 5, 1998. 
While this paper does not explain the events behind the 
financial crisis, a few notable events are included in the chart 
as reference points.7
One aspect of the financial crisis was a flight to quality in 
which yield spreads widened sharply between Treasuries and 
other fixed-income securities. Another aspect was a reduction 
in market liquidity, as an aversion to risk-taking decreased 
dealers’ willingness to take positions and make markets. An 
increased cost of borrowing securities in the repo market also 
resulted from the financial crisis as did a sharp widening in 
yields between more and less actively traded Treasury securities.
This paper’s analysis of these disruptions demonstrates why 
the benchmark topic is receiving increased attention and, more 
importantly, clarifies the market attributes that should be 
examined when evaluating alternative benchmarks. It also 
provides insight into how the Treasury market may perform if 
the outstanding debt starts declining more quickly, although it 










Sources: Bloomberg; Goldman Sachs; Merrill Lynch.
Notes: The investment-grade corporate yield is the industrials ten-year 
A2/A yield from Bloomberg. The swap rate is the ten-year semiannual 
fixed rate versus three-month LIBOR compiled by Bloomberg from 
various sources. The mortgage-backed security (MBS) yield is a 
weighted-average, option-adjusted yield calculated by Goldman Sachs. 
The Fannie Mae benchmark yield is the on-the-run ten-year 
benchmark note yield from Merrill Lynch, via Bloomberg.
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improved fiscal situation. Moreover, the analysis does not rate 
the Treasury market’s performance as a benchmark, but rather 
illustrates the growing prominence of the benchmark topic and 
the features that are important to a benchmark market.
Relative Market Performance
The performance of Treasuries and other fixed-income 
securities diverged sharply in the fall of 1998. Investors sought 
the safety of risk-free Treasuries at the expense of securities 
with credit risk in the so-called flight to quality, driving a wedge 
between their performance. Chart 2 shows that yield spreads 
of various fixed-income securities over Treasuries widened 
between mid-August and mid-October 1998, and remained 
fairly wide afterward. The yield spread between investment-
grade corporate debt securities and Treasuries, for example, 
widened from 74 basis points on August 13, 1998, to 128 basis 
points on October 19, 1998. It was 116 basis points on 
October 31, 1999.
The widening of the spread in the fall of 1998 is not 
unprecedented. Credit spreads often rise during or preceding a 
recession, and they were quite high in the early 1980s, for 
example. One of the attractive features of Treasury securities is 
their absence of default risk. This means that Treasury yield 
changes do not reflect changes in credit risk, by definition, and 
that Treasuries are inherently limited in their ability to serve as 
good hedges of fixed-income securities that contain credit risk.
Despite the widening of the spread, there does not seem to 
have been a fundamental shift in the relationship between 
Treasury yield changes and other fixed-income yield changes. 
An analysis of weekly yield changes shows that Treasuries 
remained highly correlated with other fixed-income securities 
during the height of the financial crisis (Table 1). The 
correlation between ten-year Treasury yield changes and 
investment-grade corporate yield changes, for example, fell 
only slightly—from 0.975 before the crisis to 0.965 during the 
crisis and to 0.963 after the crisis.8, 9
The disparate performance of Treasury securities and other 
fixed-income securities raises questions about the 
attractiveness of Treasuries as hedging vehicles. Those who 
shorted Treasuries as a hedge preceding the widening of the 
spread in the fall of 1998 found that their losses on Treasuries 
more than offset any gains they may have had on their long 
positions. Nonetheless, the widening of the spread was not 
unprecedented, and Treasury yield changes maintained a high 
correlation with other fixed-income yield changes.
Market Liquidity
While the Treasury market was seen as a safe and liquid haven 
for investors in fall 1998, its liquidity was adversely affected 
nonetheless. One measure of liquidity is the bid-ask spread, or 
the difference between quoted bid and offer prices. As shown in 
Chart 3, spreads in the interdealer Treasury market widened 
sharply in fall 1998 for the on-the-run ten-year note and had 
not returned to precrisis levels as of October 1999. The ten-
year note typically trades with a spread of 1/64 or 1/32 of a 
point (where one point equals 1 percent of par), but it traded 
with nearly a 3/32 average spread on October 9, 1998, and just 
over a 1/32 spread on October 29, 1999. For the ten-year note, 
1/32 of a point equals just under half a basis point in yield terms.
Another measure of liquidity is the depth of the market. 
Market depth refers to the quantity of securities that dealers are 
willing to buy and sell at various prices, and is measured here 
by the average quantity firmly offered at the best quoted bid 
and offer prices in the interdealer market. As shown in Chart 4, 
the quoted depth of the on-the-run ten-year note fell from the 
$9-$11 million range in July and August 1998 to roughly 
$6 million in October 1998. Quoted depths did not recover 
quickly after fall 1998, averaging slightly more than $5.5 million 









32nds of a point
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The chart plots the mean daily bid-ask spread in the
interdealer market for the on-the-run ten-year note.
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Millions of U.S. dollars
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots the ten-day rolling average of the mean daily
quote size in the interdealer market for the on-the-run ten-year note.
The quote size refers to the quantity of securities bid for or offered for
sale at the best bid and offer prices posted by GovPX; the mean
daily figure is calculated with both bid and offer quantities.
Chart 4
Quote Depth of Ten-Year U.S. Treasury Note
One other measure of liquidity is trading volume. Volume 
is not an ideal measure of liquidity, as it may reflect dealers’ 
eagerness to rebalance and hedge positions amid market 
turmoil, rather than their willingness to take positions and 
make markets. In fact, the volume numbers in Chart 5 show 
that trading activity actually increased throughout August and 
into early September 1998. Trading activity then declined fairly 
steadily throughout the fall before dropping off sharply at 
the end of the year; it remained lower than usual through 
October 1999.
The evidence suggests that Treasury market liquidity was 
adversely affected by the events of fall 1998 and that it did not 
recover quickly. While the market was quite volatile in fall 
1998—and somewhat more volatile after the crisis than before 
it—such volatility does not explain the diminished liquidity.10 
The events of fall 1998, concerns about Y2K, the withdrawal of 
market participants, and the reluctance of remaining 
participants to take risks are some of the factors that may have 
inhibited market liquidity even after the crisis.
Table 1










Precrisis:  July 3, 1997-Aug. 14, 1998 0.975 0.956 0.976 0.987 0.473
Crisis:  Aug. 14, 1998-Nov. 20, 1998 0.965 0.957 0.970 0.968 0.199
Postcrisis:  Nov. 20, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 0.963 0.924 0.956 0.961 0.429
Full sample:  July 3, 1997-Oct. 29, 1999 0.966 0.945 0.964 0.970 0.286
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch.
Notes: The table reports the correlations of weekly yield changes between the on-the-run ten-year U.S. Treasury note and the indicated index or security.
Correlations with the Fannie Mae benchmark are limited to the period starting February 3, 1998. The investment-grade corporate yield is the industrials ten-
year A2/A yield from Bloomberg. The mortgage-backed security yield is a weighted-average, option-adjusted yield calculated by Goldman Sachs. The Fannie 
Mae benchmark yield is the on-the-run ten-year benchmark note yield from Merrill Lynch, via Bloomberg. The swap rate is the ten-year semiannual fixed 
rate versus three-month LIBOR compiled by Bloomberg from various sources. The high-yield corporate yield is from Merrill Lynch’s High-Yield 
Master Index, via Bloomberg. 134 The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market
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July 1, 1997-Aug. 14, 1998 21.0 76.9 165.8 120.6
(30.4) (80.5) (135.8) (135.0)
Crisis:
Aug. 17, 1998-Nov. 20, 1998 52.8 126.1 115.6 211.1
(86.6) (149.3) (143.4) (164.9)
Postcrisis:
Nov. 23, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 35.3 75.0 200.3 120.1
(48.6) (86.2) (155.0) (123.9)
Full sample:
July 1, 1997-Oct. 29, 1999 30.4 81.8 173.9 130.8
(48.5) (94.3) (146.8) (137.4)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The table reports the means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) of the daily average differences between the overnight 
general collateral rate and the collateral rates on the indicated on-the-run 
securities.
Reduced market liquidity can diminish the attractiveness of 
the Treasury market both as a risk-free benchmark and as a 
benchmark for pricing and hedging. Decreased liquidity 
increases the chances that implied risk-free rates will deviate 
from the market consensus as to where risk-free rates should 
be. Decreased liquidity also raises hedgers’ direct costs of 
trading and reduces their ability to take or unload large 
positions quickly with minimal price impact. Despite the 
disruptions to Treasury market liquidity, it should be noted 
that the market remains highly liquid and that it may have been 
less disrupted by liquidity problems in fall 1998 than were other 
fixed-income markets.
The Repo Market
A repo is an agreement to exchange collateral for cash with a 
simultaneous agreement to buy back the collateral at a specified 
price at some point in the future. A dealer owning a particular 
Treasury note, for example, might agree to sell that security to 
another dealer while simultaneously agreeing to buy back the 
security the next day. The first dealer can thus use the repo 
market to finance its positions, often at a favorable rate, while 
the second dealer can use the repo market to borrow and then 
sell securities it does not hold in its portfolio.
The repo market for Treasury securities was temporarily 
disrupted by the events of fall 1998. One measure of disruption 
examines the spread between the general collateral rate and the 
collateral rate on a particular security. When an issue is in high 
demand, a dealer in effect lends funds at a rate below the rate 
that would otherwise be required to borrow a security, and the 
issue is said to be “on special.” Table 2 shows that the on-the-
run two-year note, five-year note, and thirty-year bond (but 
not the ten-year note) traded at an increased rate of specialness 
during the fall 1998 crisis, but that specialness declined after the 
crisis. The five-year note, for example, was lent at an average 
overnight rate that was 77 basis points below the general 
collateral rate before the crisis, 126 basis points during the 
crisis, and 75 basis points after the crisis.
Repo activity in on-the-run coupon securities was not 
negatively affected by the events of fall 1998. As shown in 
Table 3, overnight repo trading volume increased in fall 1998 
for the two-year and five-year notes, but it fell for the ten-year 
note and thirty-year bond. After fall 1998, repo activity 
changed little for the two-year and five-year notes, but it 
increased for the ten-year note and thirty-year bond. Overall, 
repo activity was higher after the crisis than it was before it for 
three of these four securities (all but the ten-year note). Repo 
trading volume numbers do not suggest that the use of 









Billions of U.S. dollars
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots the ten-day rolling average of daily trading
volume in the interdealer market. The volume figures are reported on
a one-way basis (so that a trade between two parties is counted only
once) and cover about 65 percent of the interdealer broker market.
Chart 5
Daily Trading Volume of U.S. Treasury Securities
Off-the-run











Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bear Stearns
and GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots the predicted yield less the market yield on a 
daily basis for the on-the-run five-year note. The predicted yield is the 
yield of a comparable-duration off-the-run security as derived from a 
model of the yield curve estimated with off-the-run prices. Changes 
in the on-the-run security are indicated by the dashed vertical lines.
Chart 6
Off-the-Run/On-the-Run Yield Spread
of Five-Year U.S. Treasury Note
Increased repo market specialness can decrease the 
attractiveness of Treasury securities as hedging vehicles 
because it makes borrowing securities more costly. Increased 
borrowing costs may also reduce market liquidity, further 
hurting the attractiveness of the Treasury market for various 
purposes, including pricing, hedging, and as a benchmark of 
risk-free rates. The evidence suggests, however, that the cost of 
borrowing on-the-run Treasury securities increased only 
briefly during the fall 1998 crisis and that repo market activity 
generally did not decline either during or after fall 1998.
Market Efficiency
One of the most striking developments in fall 1998 was a 
divergence in performance between more and less actively 
traded Treasury securities. As shown in Chart 6, the yield 
spread between the on-the-run five-year note and a 
comparable off-the-run security rose sharply in late August 
1998 and again in mid-October 1998, reaching 25 basis points 
on October 15, 1998.11 Table 4 shows that the comparable 
spread also widened sharply in fall 1998 for the two-year note 
and the thirty-year bond, albeit not for the ten-year note. On-
the-run Treasuries generally became relatively more valuable as 
investors sought not only the safety of Treasury securities but 
Table 3
Repo Trading Volume of On-the-Run U.S. Treasury 
Coupon Securities











July 1, 1997-Aug. 14, 1998 5.69 7.42 10.39 4.09
(2.94) (3.09) (4.00) (2.10)
Crisis:
Aug. 17, 1998-Nov. 20, 1998 8.33 8.72 8.44 3.54
(3.50) (3.14) (2.79) (1.69)
Postcrisis:
Nov. 23, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 8.31 8.78 9.54 4.25
(3.15) (3.19) (4.61) (1.87)
Full sample:
July 1, 1997-Oct. 29, 1999 7.04 8.11 9.82 4.09
(3.36) (3.20) (4.18) (1.97)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from GovPX.
Note: The table reports the means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) of daily overnight repurchase agreement trading volume 
in the indicated on-the-run securities as reported to GovPX.
Table 4
Off-the-Run/On-the-Run Yield Spreads












July 1, 1997-Aug. 14, 1998 2.80 4.48 7.87 5.01
(1.80) (1.90) (1.71) (1.71)
Crisis:
Aug. 17, 1998-Nov. 20, 1998 11.62 16.68 6.63 12.99
(5.76) (4.89) (3.30) (4.65)
Postcrisis:
Nov. 23, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 5.02 17.93 13.55 13.50
(2.37) (2.75) (6.93) (1.83)
Full sample:
July 1, 1997-Oct. 29, 1999 4.72 11.33 10.03 9.36
(3.86) (7.14) (5.54) (4.78)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bear Stearns and 
GovPX.
Note: The table reports the means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) of the daily off-the-run/on-the-run yield spreads of the 
indicated securities. The spreads are calculated as the predicted yields less 
the market yields, where the predicted yields are those of comparable-
duration off-the-run securities as derived from a model of the yield 
curve estimated with off-the-run prices.136 The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market
Percent
Sources: Bear Stearns; GovPX.
Note: The chart plots yields against years to maturity for Treasury
securities with more than thirty days to maturity (excluding callable 
bonds, flower bonds, and inflation-indexed securities).
Chart 7

















Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bear Stearns
and GovPX.
Notes: The chart plots the median absolute daily error between 
predicted and market yields for off-the-run notes and bonds with 
more than thirty days to maturity (excluding callable bonds, flower 
bonds, and inflation-indexed securities). Predicted yields are derived 
from a model of the yield curve estimated with off-the-run prices.
Chart 8
Median Absolute Error between Predicted 
and Market U.S. Treasury Yields
Percent
Sources: Bear Stearns; GovPX.
Note: The chart plots yields against years to maturity for Treasury
securities with more than thirty days to maturity (excluding callable 
bonds, flower bonds, and inflation-indexed securities).
Chart 9
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also the liquidity of the on-the-run issues in the so-called flight 
to liquidity.12 After the crisis, spreads remained high on the 
five-year note and the thirty-year bond, they increased for the 
ten-year note, but they declined for the two-year note.
Another development in fall 1998 was a divergence in 
pricing among off-the-run securities, possibly due to a decline 
in Treasury market arbitrage. The efficiency of the Treasury 
market typically results in off-the-run securities of similar 
maturity trading relatively close to one another in terms of 
yield. When Treasury yields are plotted against time to 
maturity, they usually form a relatively smooth curve, as shown 
for May 13, 1998 (Chart 7). The smoothness of the yield curve 
over time is estimated here as the median absolute error 
between market yields and the yields predicted by a term 
structure model.13 As shown in Chart 8, the median rose 
sharply between late August and mid-October 1998—peaking 
at 2.3 basis points on October 8, 1998—and remained relatively 
high after the crisis.
The relative performance of Treasuries in the fall of 1998 is 
summarized in Chart 9, which plots yields against years to 
maturity for October 9, 1998. The chart shows the wide 
dispersion of off-the-run yields, as documented in Chart 8. It 
also shows the wide yield spreads between on-the-run coupon 
securities and comparable-maturity off-the-run securities, as 
shown in Chart 6.
The divergent performance of Treasury securities raises 
concerns about the market’s usefulness both as a risk-free 
interest-rate benchmark and as a benchmark for pricing and 
hedging. Differences in the liquidity or specialness of Treasury 
securities can result in different implied risk-free rates, raising 
the issue of which risk-free rate is the appropriate one. Such 
differences also create an additional performance wedge 
between Treasuries and other fixed-income securities, possibly FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 137
decreasing their correlation.14 Nevertheless, while the 
divergent performance of Treasuries may hinder their role as a 
benchmark, it is noteworthy that this divergence may largely 
reflect market participants’ demand for the securities’ safety 
and liquidity. Characteristics that make the Treasury market an 
attractive benchmark in some ways may therefore result in 
performance undesirable of a benchmark in other ways.
Alternative Benchmarks
The recent performance of the benchmark U.S. Treasury 
market and the improved fiscal situation raise the issue of 
which market or markets might serve as a future benchmark. 
While there is no obvious U.S. dollar alternative for risk-free 
rates, several markets are already assuming a limited benchmark 
role for pricing and hedging securities and as reference rates for 
monitoring and analytical purposes. These markets include the 
agency debt market, the corporate debt market, and the 
interest-rate swaps market. Each is examined in turn with 
regard to the features that make a good benchmark market.
The Agency Debt Market
Agency securities are obligations of federal government 
agencies or government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBanks), 
the Farm Credit Banks, Sallie Mae, and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority.15 The agencies issue debt securities to finance 
activities that are supported by public policy, including home 
ownership, farming, and education. The securities typically are 
not backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, 
as is the case with Treasury securities, and therefore trade with 
some credit risk. They are nevertheless considered to be of very 
high credit quality and are rated Aaa/AAA by the major rating 
agencies.
Seeking to capitalize on the market’s interest in large, liquid 
issues amid reduced Treasury supply, the agencies have 
introduced their own benchmark debt issuance programs, 
starting with Fannie Mae’s Benchmark Notes Program in 
January 1998. The programs provide for the regular issuance of 
large-size, noncallable coupon securities in a range of 
maturities (originally two to ten years), and thus mimic the 
Treasury Department’s issuance practices. The benchmark 
securities are intended to appeal to investors who might 
typically buy Treasury securities, and are promoted as Treasury 
substitutes.16
The agency benchmark programs have expanded rapidly in 
their breadth and depth. Freddie Mac introduced its Reference 
Notes Program in April 1998; the FHLBanks introduced their 
Tap Issuance Program in July 1999 and also increased issuance 
sizes in their Global Debt Program; and the Farm Credit Banks 
introduced their Designated Bonds Program in March 1999. 
The programs have expanded beyond their original scope with 
the introduction of callable benchmark programs, the issuance 
of longer term securities, and the announcements of auction 
schedules. In November 1999, both Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac announced the introduction of benchmark bill programs, 
with weekly auctions of large-size discount securities.
As shown in Table 5, benchmark issues of the three largest 
agencies generally range from $3-$6 billion in size (as of 
October 1999), and thus are about one-fifth to one-half as large 
as comparable Treasury issues. As shown in Table 6, total 
benchmark issuances in 1999 through October were roughly 
$40 billion for each of the three largest agencies, versus 
$234 billion in Treasury coupon security issuances. Agency 
benchmark debt outstanding is even smaller relative to that 
of the Treasury Department, due to the recent introduction of 
the agency benchmark programs. Fannie Mae, for example, had 
$94 billion in noncallable benchmark securities outstanding on 
October 31, 1999 (Fannie Mae 1999b), whereas the Treasury 
Department had $2.4 trillion in marketable fixed-rate coupon 
securities outstanding (Bureau of the Public Debt 1999).
Table 5
Issue Sizes of Agency and U.S. Treasury Coupon
Securities as of October 31, 1999












Two-year — 5.0a 3.0 3.5a 15.0
Three-year 3.0 5.0 3.0 3.4a —
Five-year 6.5a 3.0 — 2.0a 15.0
Seven-year — — — 1.1a —
Ten-year 3.5 6.0 — 0.6a 12.0
Thirty-year 4.25a — — — 10.0
Sources: Bloomberg; FHLBanks, Office of Finance; Freddie Mac.
Notes: The table reports the sizes of the most recent noncallable 
benchmark coupon issues as of October 31, 1999. Securities more than 
one year old are excluded. FHLBanks Global Debt Program issues exclude 
a $1 billion one-year coupon issue and a $3.5 billion issue originally issued 
with three years to maturity. U.S. Treasury issue sizes exclude amounts 
issued to refund maturing securities of Federal Reserve Banks as well as 
amounts bid for by Federal Reserve Banks on behalf of foreign and 
international monetary authorities.  
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Sources: Author’s projections; U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
projections; Federal Reserve Bulletin (various issues); Treasury Bulletin 
(various issues).
Notes: Figures are reported as of September 30, except for the 1999
agency debt figure, which is reported as of June 30. Treasury debt
projections are the CBO’s as of July 1999; they assume that current laws 
and policies remain unchanged and they exclude debt held in U.S. 
government accounts. Agency debt projections assume that the market 
grows at the same rate as the economy (according to CBO projections 
of GDP).
Chart 10
Historical and Projected Agency 
and U.S. Treasury Debt
Projection
The stock of agency debt securities outstanding provides a 
guide as to how large the agency benchmark programs can 
become. As of June 30, 1999, agency debt outstanding totaled 
$1.4 trillion, versus $3.7 trillion of Treasury debt held by the 
public (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1999; Treasury Bulletin 1999). 
As shown in Chart 10, the agency debt market has grown 
rapidly in recent years, whereas the Treasury market has leveled 
off. Even if agency debt growth slowed to the rate of GDP 
growth (projected by the CBO), the agency debt market would 
surpass the U.S. Treasury market in size in fiscal year 2007 if the 
Treasury market shrinks according to the CBO’s July 1999 
projections.
The performance of agency securities versus other fixed-
income securities suggests that agencies may be good pricing 
and hedging benchmarks. Fixed-income securities with credit 
risk (or spread products) largely moved together during and 
after the fall 1998 crisis, as shown in Chart 2. The correlations 
of the weekly yield changes of the Fannie Mae ten-year 
benchmark with those of other spread products are high, as 
shown in Table 7, and are comparable to those of Treasuries 
with other spread products (Table 1). The correlation between 
the Fannie Mae benchmark and mortgage-backed securities, 
for example, was 0.954 for the postcrisis period, versus 0.924 
for Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities.
Agency market liquidity does not yet approach that of the 
U.S. Treasury market. As shown in Table 8, trading in agency 
coupon securities by the primary government securities dealers 
averaged $7.9 billion per day before the fall 1998 crisis, versus 
$183 billion in Treasury coupon securities. Trading in agency 
coupons increased to $10.7 billion per day after the crisis, while 
comparable Treasury trading fell, but agency coupon trading 
still equaled only 6.8 percent of postcrisis Treasury trading. 
Fannie Mae reports that its benchmark securities have liquidity 
comparable to off-the-run Treasury securities, with bid-ask 
spreads of 0.5 to 2.0 basis points (Fannie Mae 1999a).
An active overnight repo market in agency securities has 
developed, allowing market participants to borrow securities 
for hedging and trading purposes, although an active term repo 
market has not yet emerged. Agency issues sometimes trade on 
special, although typically still close to general collateral. As a 
result, Fannie Mae reports that its issues are largely unaffected 
by issue-specific differences in specialness or liquidity (Fannie 
Mae 1999a). Unlike the Treasury market, there is no futures 
market for agency securities.17
Agency debt securities are treated as benchmarks in a few 
respects. First, the yields on benchmark securities are used as 
Table 6
Issuance of Agency and U.S. Treasury Coupon 
Securities from January to October 1999












Two-year — 9.0 17.0 3.9 135.0
Three-year 3.0 10.5 9.0 3.4 —
Five-year 19.5 9.0 — 2.3 45.0
Seven-year — — — 1.3 —
Ten-year 15.5 13.0 — 0.7 34.0
Thirty-year 4.25 — — — 20.0
Total 42.25 41.5 26.0 11.7 234.0
Sources: Bloomberg; Fannie Mae; FHLBanks, Office of Finance; 
Freddie Mac.
Notes: The table reports noncallable benchmark coupon security 
issuance between January 1 and October 31, 1999. The FHLBanks Global 
Debt Program two-year amount includes a one-year issue as well as the 
reopenings of an old three-year note at two-and-a-half and two-and-a-
quarter years to maturity. The FHLBanks two-year Tap Issuance Program 
amount includes a one-and-a-half-year issue, the three-year amount 
includes a two-and-a-half-year issue, the five-year amount includes a 
four-year issue, the seven-year amount includes an eight-year issue, and 
the ten-year amount includes a fifteen-year issue. U.S. Treasury issuance 
excludes amounts issued to refund maturing securities of Federal Reserve 
Banks as well as amounts bid for by Federal Reserve Banks on behalf of 
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barometers of the agency market for monitoring and analytical 
purposes. Second, agencies are used as hedging vehicles to a 
certain extent, particularly for mortgage-backed securities. 
Finally, at least one new debt issue has been priced relative to a 
benchmark agency security as of October 1999.18
Several attributes favor the agency debt securities market as 
a benchmark market. Namely, the performance of agency 
securities is highly correlated with that of other spread 
products, and agencies—because of their credit risk—have the 
potential to be better pricing and hedging vehicles than 
Treasuries. The market is also reasonably liquid, agencies trade 
in an active overnight repo market, and agencies reportedly 
have been relatively unaffected by issue-specific differences in 
liquidity or specialness. Steps taken by the agencies to increase 
issuance sizes are likely to improve market liquidity, and the 
announcements of issuance schedules and the resulting 
predictability of agency issuance are likely to improve activity 
in the term repo market.19
Nevertheless, other attributes do not favor the agency debt 
securities market as a benchmark. Credit risk, for example, may 
cause agencies to trade in line with other spread products, but 
the presence of such risk also means that there is an 
idiosyncratic risk component to agency securities that could 
become important in the future. Market liquidity also does not 
compare with that of the Treasury market, the overnight repo 
market is less active than the Treasury market, the term repo 
market is not active at all, and there is not yet an agency futures 
market. Furthermore, while agency securities may not be 
affected by issue-specific differences in liquidity or repo market 
specialness, this condition may reflect the lack of demand 
among market participants to borrow and trade agency 
benchmark issues. If the popularity of agency benchmark 
securities increases, issue-specific differences may become 
more important.
Table 7








Precrisis:  Feb. 3, 1998-Aug. 14, 1998 0.948 0.926 0.976 0.422 0.976
Crisis:  Aug. 14, 1998-Nov. 20, 1998 0.915 0.949 0.990 0.292 0.970
Postcrisis:  Nov. 20, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 0.934 0.954 0.983 0.450 0.956
Full sample:  Feb. 3, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 0.926 0.950 0.985 0.309 0.964
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch.
Notes: The table reports the correlations of weekly yield changes between the on-the-run ten-year Fannie Mae benchmark note and the indicated index or 
security. The Fannie Mae benchmark yield is from Merrill Lynch, via Bloomberg. The investment-grade corporate yield is the industrials ten-year A2/A yield 
from Bloomberg. The mortgage-backed security yield is a weighted-average, option-adjusted yield calculated by Goldman Sachs. The swap rate is the ten-
year semiannual fixed rate versus three-month LIBOR compiled by Bloomberg from various sources. The high-yield corporate yield is from Merrill Lynch’s 
High-Yield Master Index, via Bloomberg. 
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Jan. 22, 1998-Aug. 12, 1998 7.9 183.3 4.4
(1.3) (29.1) (0.8)
Crisis:
Aug. 13, 1998-Nov. 18, 1998 9.5 223.1 4.3
(1.2) (34.1) (0.6)
Postcrisis:
Nov. 19, 1998-Oct. 27, 1999 10.7 156.7 6.8
(3.0) (25.8) (1.8)
Full sample:
Jan. 22, 1998-Oct. 27, 1999 9.6 175.2 5.7
(2.7) (36.5) (1.9)
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York and Federal Reserve Bulletin (1999).
Notes: The table reports the means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) of average daily coupon security trading volume (reported 
weekly) of the primary government securities dealers.140 The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market
The Corporate Debt Market
Corporate debt securities are issued to meet a variety of longer 
term corporate financing needs. Their credit risk varies 
significantly across issues, from relatively safe Aaa/AAA-rated 
issues to non–investment-grade Ba/B, B/B, and Caa/CCC 
issues. The corporate debt market is larger, but far more 
segmented, than the agency debt market, with debt outstanding 
totaling $2.9 trillion on September 30, 1999 (Bond Market 
Association 1999).
Corporate issuers recently have increased issuance sizes and 
regularity to appeal to investor demand for large, liquid issues. 
Ford Motor Company, in particular, announced its Global 
Landmark Securities (GlobLS) Program in June 1999, modeled 
on the programs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Under the 
program, Ford and its financing subsidiary, Ford Motor Credit 
Company, announced that they would bring offerings of at 
least $3 billion to market two to four times per year. Ford 
issued $8.6 billion in four parts in July 1999 as part of the 
program and $5 billion in a single part in October 1999.
While the Ford issuances are large by corporate standards, 
they are significantly less than those of the agencies. In 1999, 
through October, Ford issued $13.6 billion in its GlobLS 
Program, as opposed to roughly $40 billion each in the three 
largest agencies’ benchmark programs. It is worth noting that 
Ford’s issuances are constrained by the size of the company’s 
balance sheet. Ford had debt outstanding of $144 billion 
on June 30, 1999 (Ford Motor Company 1999), versus 
$500 billion for Fannie Mae, $437 billion for the FHLBanks, 
and $314 billion for Freddie Mac (Federal Reserve Bulletin 1999).
Liquidity of the large Ford issues is reportedly favorable, 
with bid-ask spreads of 1 to 2 basis points, compared with 3 to 
5 basis points for smaller issues of similar quality (Bloomberg 
1999). There is no futures market for Ford or other corporate 
issues, and corporate issues are not actively traded in the repo 
market. 
Ford GlobLS play a limited benchmark role in the corporate 
market. They are used as reference rates for monitoring the 
performance of the corporate market, for evaluating other 
outstanding corporate debt securities, and for helping to decide 
how other new corporate debt issues should be priced. Hedging 
activity using corporate issues is limited.
The corporate market’s potential as a benchmark is limited 
by its fragmented nature, with the largest corporate issuers 
being smaller than the large agency issuers. Corporates also 
do not have the creditworthiness of the agencies (Ford is rated 
A1/A), so that firm-specific developments may be more 
important in explaining the performance of any particular 
issuer’s securities. Nevertheless, the trend toward increased 
issuance sizes and regularity will likely increase the role of 
corporates as benchmarks for monitoring and analysis within 
the corporate market.
The Interest-Rate Swaps Market
An interest-rate swap is an agreement between two parties to 
exchange one stream of interest payments for another stream. 
The most common interest-rate swap is used to exchange fixed 
interest-rate payments for floating interest-rate payments for a 
given principal amount and period of time. The floating rate in 
such contracts is often based on the London Interbank Offer 
Rate (LIBOR)—the rate that banks charge one another for 
funds in the Eurodollar market.
Swap rates are quoted in terms of the fixed rate that 
must be paid to convert to a floating rate. At the close of 
September 30, 1999, for example, the quoted ten-year swap 
rate on Bloomberg was 6.85 percent. An entity therefore had 
to make semiannual fixed interest payments for ten years at an 
annual rate of 6.85 percent to get semiannual floating interest 
payments for ten years based on three-month LIBOR (for the 
same principal amount). Swap rates are often quoted relative 
to the Treasury benchmark, so that the ten-year spread on 
September 30 was quoted as 97 basis points (calculated as the 
6.85 percent swap rate less the 5.88 percent yield on the on-
the-run ten-year Treasury note). Swap rates exceed those on 
Treasuries mainly because the floating payments are based on 
a rate that contains credit risk (LIBOR is an Aa/AA rate).
Since they are based on a floating rate that contains credit 
risk, swap rates often change in line with yields on other spread 
products. Swap spreads thus widened sharply in fall 1998 along 
with those of corporates, agencies, and mortgage-backed 
securities, as shown in Chart 2. Correlations of weekly changes 
in ten-year swap rates with yields of other spread products, 
shown in Table 9, are close to those of Treasuries with other 
spread products (Table 1). The correlation with Fannie Mae’s 
benchmark note, for example, is 0.985 for swaps, versus 0.964 
for Treasuries (for the full sample period).
The interest-rate swaps market is very active, with narrow 
bid-ask spreads. A market survey by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York (1998) found daily trading in U.S. dollar interest-
rate swaps to be $22 billion per day in April 1998.20 Turnover 
is thus considerably higher than it is in agency coupon 
securities, but less than it is in Treasury securities. Bid-ask 
spreads on active contracts reportedly are about 1 basis point, 
somewhat wider than those on active Treasury securities.
The liquidity of the swaps market is hindered by 
counterparty credit risk. Counterparty credit risk is the risk 
that one’s counterparty in a swap defaults on its end of the 
agreement. The risk is an obstacle to liquidity because, by FRBNY Economic Policy Review / April 2000 141
Table 9










Precrisis:  July 3, 1997-Aug. 14, 1998 0.960 0.942 0.976 0.527 0.987
Crisis:  Aug. 14, 1998-Nov. 20, 1998 0.918 0.936 0.990 0.291 0.968
Postcrisis:  Nov. 20, 1998-Oct. 29, 1999 0.941 0.954 0.983 0.454 0.961
Full sample: July 3, 1997-Oct. 29, 1999 0.938 0.946 0.985 0.346 0.970
Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from Bloomberg, Goldman Sachs, and Merrill Lynch.
Notes: The table reports the correlations of weekly yield changes between the ten-year swap rate and the indicated index or security. Correlations with the 
Fannie Mae benchmark are limited to the period starting February 3, 1998. The swap rate is the semiannual fixed rate versus three-month LIBOR compiled 
by Bloomberg from various sources. The investment-grade corporate yield is the industrials ten-year A2/A yield from Bloomberg. The mortgage-backed 
security yield is a weighted-average, option-adjusted yield calculated by Goldman Sachs. The Fannie Mae benchmark yield is the on-the-run ten-year 
benchmark note yield from Merrill Lynch, via Bloomberg. The high-yield corporate yield is from Merrill Lynch’s High-Yield Master Index, via Bloomberg.   
definition, it depends on the parties involved in a transaction. 
A dealer that has engaged in a swap contract and wants to 
unwind it either has to go back to the original counterparty, 
which may not want to unwind, or find a third party to take its 
side of the swap—one that is also acceptable to the original 
counterparty. To mitigate counterparty credit risk, some 
dealers execute swaps out of credit-enhanced subsidiaries and 
structure swaps so that they automatically unwind if a party’s 
Aaa/AAA credit rating is lost.
The absence of an underlying fundamental asset is also an 
advantage of the swaps market. There is no supply limit on 
swap contracts and no need to borrow securities to go short, as 
an entity can enter into as many swap contracts as it wants. 
Specific issue concerns are also mitigated by the nature of 
swaps. The ability to create a swap combined with the fungible 
nature of the underlying cash flows precludes swaps with the 
same or nearly the same cash flows from trading at widely 
different rates.
Swaps are used as benchmarks for hedging positions taken 
in other markets, including the agency debt, corporate debt, 
and mortgage-backed securities markets. They are used as well 
for analytical and monitoring purposes in evaluating the 
performance of other fixed-income markets. Swap rates are 
also used as reference rates for forecasting, for example, the 
path of LIBOR.
Several features favor the interest-rate swaps market as a 
benchmark. As the underlying floating rate has credit risk, the 
performance of swaps is highly correlated with that of other 
spread products, and swaps have the potential to be a better 
hedge than Treasuries. The absence of an underlying asset 
allows for dealers to take unlimited long or short positions 
without having to worry about obtaining securities in the repo 
market. These same features mitigate security-specific issues 
that might cause a particular maturity swap to deviate sharply 
from the performance of the whole swaps curve.
However, counterparty credit risk is a feature that does not 
favor the swaps market as a benchmark. Such risk means that 
swaps created by different parties have different risks and are 
not perfectly fungible. Lack of fungibility adversely affects 
liquidity. Market participants have taken steps to mitigate the 
effects of counterparty credit risk, but it remains a hindrance to 
the market’s liquidity and to the market assuming a larger 
benchmark role.
Conclusion
The country’s improved fiscal situation raises questions about 
the U.S. Treasury market’s benchmark status. If projected 
budget surpluses materialize, they could lead to a significant 
reduction in the Treasury market’s size and to a deterioration 
in the market’s liquidity and efficiency. A less liquid and less 
efficient market would represent a less useful benchmark of 
risk-free interest rates as well as a less useful benchmark for 
pricing and hedging positions in other markets.
The financial markets crisis of fall 1998 heightened 
investors’ concerns about the Treasury market’s benchmark 
role and provided insight into how the market may perform in 
the future. A flight to quality into Treasury securities caused 
yields between Treasuries and other fixed-income securities to 
diverge. A related flight to liquidity also led yields among 
similar Treasury securities to diverge. Market liquidity also 142 The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market
declined, and the cost of borrowing securities through the repo 
market increased. After fall 1998, market conditions did not 
quickly return to precrisis levels, possibly reflecting a more 
general decline in fixed-income liquidity as well as a continued 
high demand among market participants for benchmark 
Treasuries.
Other fixed-income markets—including the agency debt, 
corporate debt, and interest-rate swaps markets—have 
demonstrated some of the characteristics that potentially make 
them suitable benchmarks for pricing and hedging purposes. 
Furthermore, the attributes that are favorable to a benchmark 
have been improving in the agency and corporate debt markets 
as benchmark debt issuance programs are expanding and steps 
are being taken to develop repo market activity. At this point, 
the agency debt and swaps markets are already assuming a 
limited benchmark role as hedging vehicles and as reference 
yields for market monitoring and analytical purposes.Endnotes
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1. For recent reviews of the U.S. Treasury market, see Dupont and 
Sack (1999) and Fabozzi and Fleming (forthcoming).
2. In contrast, floating-rate issues typically are priced relative to the 
London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), the short-term rate charged 
among banks in the Eurodollar market. A recent issue of Daimler-
Chrysler AG, for example, had a three-year floating-rate portion 
priced relative to three-month LIBOR along with five-year and ten-
year fixed-rate portions priced relative to comparable Treasuries 
(Wall Street Journal 1999b).
3. Debt held by the public excludes $2.0 trillion held in U.S. 
government accounts. Debt figures are from the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office (1999) and Treasury Bulletin (1999).
4. Significant debt management changes typically are announced at 
the Treasury’s Quarterly Refunding Press Conferences. The press 
releases for such conferences are posted at http://www.treas.gov/press/
releases. Also see U.S. General Accounting Office (1999) for a more 
extensive discussion of recent changes in Treasury debt management.
5. The buyback rules are described in detail in the Federal Register and 
are available at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/gsr/gsrbuyback.htm.
6. In fact, in February 2000, the Treasury announced a number of 
additional debt management changes at its Quarterly Refunding Press 
Conference, including a reduction in the issuance frequency of one-
year bills from every four weeks to four times per year. This followed 
the release of a CBO budget and economic outlook in January 2000 
that projected even larger surpluses over the next ten years.
7. See Bank for International Settlements (1999) for an analysis of the 
events of fall 1998.
8. The precrisis, crisis, and postcrisis time periods are defined 
somewhat arbitrarily. The precrisis period runs from July 1, 1997, 
through August 14, 1998—the Friday preceding the Russian effective 
default and ruble devaluation on August 17, 1998. The crisis period 
runs from the close of August 14, 1998, through November 20, 1998—
the Friday after the Federal Reserve System’s third and final fed funds 
target-rate cut of 1998, on November 17. The postcrisis period runs 
from the close of November 20, 1998, through October 29, 1999.
9. It is possible that such subperiod correlations mask a shift in the 
relationship among yield changes between periods. To test this 
possibility, we also estimated correlations between actual yield 
changes and the yield changes predicted for a security from a least-
squares regression of that security’s yield changes on Treasury yield 
changes for the preceding ten weeks. These correlations are similar to 
those reported in Table 1 and are therefore not reported separately.
10. Volatility was estimated on a daily basis over the full sample period 
using a GARCH(1,1) model of on-the-run ten-year note yield 
changes. Predicted volatility from this model helps explain the 
variation in both bid-ask spreads and quoted depths.  However, 
dummy variables representing the crisis and postcrisis periods remain 
highly significant explanatory variables, even after controlling for 
predicted volatility.
11. The comparable off-the-run yield is calculated as the yield 
predicted for the on-the-run security from a model of the yield curve 
estimated with off-the-run prices. The model is estimated using a 
flexible functional form proposed by Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos 
(1995) in which a set of simple functions (cubic splines) covering 
different maturity ranges are used to describe the zero curve. The 
model is estimated to fit Treasury bid prices, excluding the two most 
recently issued securities of a given maturity, securities with less than 
thirty-one days to maturity, callable bonds, flower bonds, and 
inflation-indexed securities.
12. The increased relative value of on-the-run securities also likely 
reflected the securities’ increased specialness in the repo market. 
The relationship between Treasury security value and specialness is 
discussed and documented in Duffie (1996) and Jordan and 
Jordan (1997).
13. The predicted yields are estimated according to the process 
described in endnote 11. The median is estimated daily for off-the-run 
notes and bonds with more than thirty days to maturity, excluding 
callable bonds, flower bonds, and inflation-indexed securities.
14. The premium afforded to liquid on-the-run securities may explain 
why some market participants started using off-the-run Treasury 
yields for pricing corporate securities and as market barometers 
(Wall Street Journal 1999a). Unfortunately, the same feature that may 
make off-the-run Treasuries a better gauge of Treasury market 
performance—their relative lack of liquidity—also makes them poor 
vehicles for hedging purposes as well as more susceptible to 
idiosyncratic price changes.
15. See Fabozzi and Fleming (forthcoming) for a recent review of the 
agency debt securities market.144 The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market 
Endnotes (Continued)
16. Fannie Mae stated that “the liquidity of the benchmark notes 
combined with the outstanding credit quality should cause 
benchmark notes to be viewed by many investors as a higher yielding 
alternative to off-the-run Treasuries” (http://www.fanniemae.com/
markets/debt/benchmark_prod.html). Freddie Mac indicated that 
“the fundamental characteristics of reference notes are designed to 
appeal to investors seeking alternatives to the declining supply of U.S. 
Treasury notes and bonds” (http://www.freddiemac.com/debt/html/
borrowprog.html). Finally, the FHLBanks remarked that “TAP issues 
have many of the properties of U.S. Treasuries” (Federal Home Loan 
Banks 1999).
17. However, in January 2000, both the Chicago Board of Trade and 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange announced plans to list agency note 
futures and options contracts.
18. In August 1999, a new issue of Private Export Funding Corp. was 
marketed in terms of Fannie Mae’s benchmark ten-year note, 
reportedly the first private debt issue priced off an agency security 
(Wall Street Journal 1999c).
19. Freddie Mac, for example, announced a financing calendar in 
June 1999 (Freddie Mac 1999) and Fannie Mae announced a goal of 
$6-$8 billion issuance sizes for new benchmark notes in October 1999 
(Fannie Mae 1999c).
20. Note that this is the average notional principal amount on which 
parties agreed to exchange interest payments, rather than the value of 
securities traded.References
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